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 Turning the Law into Laws 
for Political Analysis 
Gary Wickham 
Introduction 
wo  concepts  have  been  (and  continue  to  be)  extremely  in-
fiuential  in the  political  analysis of legal  relations - the  con-
cept  of power and the concept of the  law  (in  th~ singul:.1r). 
Consider the following brief excerpts from the  writings of Marx and 
Engels (collected in Campbell and Wiles, 1979): 
In all  states other than democratic ones the  state, the 
law,  the  constitution  is  what  rules,  without  really 
ruling ...  (Marx, from "Connibution to the  Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of Law",  1843, as quoted: 33, em-
phasis in original) 
If power is taken as  the basis of right, as  Hobbes, etc., 
do,  then  right,  law,  etc.  are merely  the  symptom,  the 
expre~sion of other relations upon which State power 
rests. (Marx and Engels, from The German Ideology, 
1846, as quoted: 37, emphasis in original) 
In a modem state, law must not only correspond to the 
general economic condition and be its expression, but 
must  also  be  an  internally  coherent  expression 
(Engels, from  a  lerter to  C  Schmidt,  1890, as  quoted: 
39, emphasis in original) 
While it  would be  absurd  to  suggest that these  passages are  the 
basis of the  type of political analysis of law referred to above, it  is 
quite  reasonable  to  see  them as  representative of a  certain way  ot 
constructing and understanding the politics uf laws: grand concepts-
power and the l:nv- for a grand project- understanding and  perh~1p~ 
even changing society and/or the state. 
This essay will make no comment on the  approp1iareness of these 
40 two concepts and  this  project for the places in  which Marx and  En-
gels worked or for the times in  which they worked. Rather, the  ess<~v 
wi IJ  address  the  conrem porary  relevance  of  these  concepts,  par-
ticularly  \.vithin  the  confines  of Australian political  anulysis.  I  will 
argue  that  they  are  not  immediately  appropriate  and  that  they  c111 
and ~hould be overhauled. 
The main focus of the essay wili  be  the concept of the law.  Con-
sideration will  be  given  to  the  concept of power only to  the  extent 
necessary to support the  arguments about the law. This limited con-
sider<Jtion  of  power  will  be  carried  out  in  the  first  section.  The 
second section will contain the main arguments about the law, while 
the  third and final  sectron will  be  an example of a political  analys1~ 
which uses the concept which will emerge from  the  overh<~ul of th<' 
law undertaken in the second section. 
Scn1pping the Concept of P<n1er 
n the  ca~e of the concept of power. I don't think the  word ··over-
haul"  whtch  l  used  above  is  strong  enough.  Elsewhere  (Wick-
h<tnL  1  ')i\7) r have gone so  far  as  to  argue that there is  a need  tu 
ob~mclon  the  ,_·,mcept,  at  least  for  the  time  being.  I  will  present  :1 
surnrn;try nr my  arguments and hrieAy develop them in this section. 
The  bast" of my  arguments against power is  a  sympathetic criri-
qu,_'  uf some of Foucault's pteces on power.  (Wickham,  1983) Thi·. 
criiiquc  re~t,:hed the  conclusion that while Foucault's work on power 
succe\~t\Jily combats essentialist tendencies in much power analysi'. 
- tc:r;dt'nci,~s to  read  particular objects of analysis  in  terms of an es-
senlt\ like  cl~hs. the  ~;tate or the indi\idual- it suffers from  ir.:;  own 
fm,n ot ·~~"''ntiali\nL In other words, Foucault combats the  tendenc\ 
t''  ;·,_·ad  po\WT  in  term' of certain essences, but does not completeh 
Clll:!h;tr rhc  tendencv fti  ~~r:gregate unneces;,arily which is  at the he:u1 
(!!  ,·,•,cmi:di~;m  L1ng  ~t,rnding  e~sences are  scrutinized and,  in  the 
nr:1in.  r<:Jt'Ctt:d.  But  Fuuc~rult's  cll1:11ysis  still  involves  unnecessarily 
C''t;~:rri,t~!  'dill'U:.  p:irls  - f11r  example.  operc~tion  of  power  in 
!F'Si'Tl'-. ''i'l'f,tti<Jn of f'<l\\er  111  lhl:;pitals, operation of power in men-
t:'i  '  ··':tur;"n:·  etc  rnt11  a r111ilied  whnle. This unnecessary  aggreg~r­
)~-\  t~:~il k·1JC\  !c~~d\ 10  ,J  !lt.~\\  t?~<'";t.'nce. 
h •i'L''·  !!\;:'  ~:-,,:,  the>  .\j'<c'CJ Ire  foci  of  FoUL'ault's  particuLtr, 
·,,  '·  · •:';:,,·rt,.d •n ·  ..  ,-·.  '')  .t."~"'.C:J:ltinn\ (the operation of power 
:::  '  r:rf.,  ',)!!  ;·,  ll!mh:n,·d l:fc hnond  the~e panicul:tr n:c 
i l gregations and function for other of his analyses as  a universal, eter-
nal  entity  (an uncontrolled, limitless,  unnecessary  aggregation),  as 
what I call an essence. This new essence is called discipline, or dis-
ciplinary power, or simply power (the temptation to spell these tenns 
with a capital D and a capital Pis great). 
On the  basis  of this  critique  of Foucault  I  have  identified  two 
closely related problems which justify the abandonment of the con-
cept of power. The first problem is  the ontological status which the 
concept of power has assumed in much analysis. Power has become 
its  own reality.  To  illustrate this  point I  will  tum to  an  essay often 
used in Australia to  introduce students to  some of the complexities 
of the  concept of power - Bob Connell's and  Terry  Irving's,  "Yes, 
Virginia, There is a Ruling Class". (1976) 
For Connell and Irving - and it must be remembered that their es-
say  is  a  fairly  typical  example,  part of a  long  tradition (spanning 
both Marxism and liberalism) of understanding power; I am illustrat-
ing  here  rather than criticizing - power is  a  real  entity  in its  own 
right. It is manifested in a "system" or a "structure". 
000  if we are seeking to define the State, it is in part the 
system of power that  structures  the  whole  society  ... 
( 1976: 82) 
000  the class rules jointly by preserving the power struc-
ture  oo.  (1976: 83, emphasis deleted) 
Power may be examined in smaller units - for instance, 
economic power, political power and cultural power -
(1976:  83)  but it still  functions  as  an  entity  with its 
own existence or operation. 
The  result  of this  situation  is  that  those  carrying  out  analyses 
spend  a  lot of their time  trying  to  know  power itself.  They  wield 
their tools of analysis - be they surveys, theoretical arguments or ar-
chive examinations - with this  goal. The objects of analysis  which 
have been unnecessarily aggregated into  power - the  arrangements 
and  outcomes  of contests  over  different  objectives  in  particular 
places, like government departments, schools, hospitals, prisons, etc 
- are ignored or marginalized. Analysts might more productively, in 
terms  of understanding  and/or contributing to  any  one  of the  dif-
ferent contests referred to  above, employ their time addressing these 
42 objects of analysis in their own right, using controlled techniques of 
aggregation where necessary (ie only where the aggregated unit has 
clear, specific conditions of operations). 
The second problem of our two related problems involves the sin-
gular status of power.  Power is examined not only as  a real entity, 
but  as  the  one  and  only  entity  worth  examining.  All  objects  of 
analysis - all  arrangements and outcomes of contests over different 
objectives - become power. Any number of objects of analysis be-
come the one object: power. Consider, as  a very brief illustration, the 
ready  way  in  which Connell  and  Irving use  the  singular form for 
power and related concepts in the previously quoted passages. 
The question will  now be  asked,  if we  abandon the  concept of 
power,  what  tools  are  available  for  us  to  investigate  the  arran-
gements and outcomes of contests over different objectives in par-
ticular places involving particular forces? The most obvious answer 
is  that we have no general, all-purpose tools and that this is a good 
thing. Analyses must concentrate on whichever one or grouping of 
these  contests  is  the  object  of investigation  without  reference  to 
general  concepts;  their tools  cannot be  specified in advance. They 
will  be  whatever tools  that  are  useful at  the  time.  The criteria by 
which their usefulness will be judged, like the tools themselves, will 
be  shifting  criteria  with  limited  temporal  and  spatial  currency1  -
limited to  what we might call particular communities of analysis (a 
point which owes as much to Kuhn [1962] and Feyerabend [1978] as 
it does to  Foucault). 
To  supplement  this  obvious  answer I  would  like  to  advocate  a 
wide  role for one particular concept - the  concept of politics. This 
can be done without making this concept into a direct substitute for 
power, saddled with the same problems of ontological and singular 
status discussed above. It can be done because I am not suggesting 
that politics perfonn the same unifying function that power performs 
and I am not seeking to grant politics a role beyond the temporal and 
spatial  limits  referred  to  above.  Politics can be  useful  for  the  time 
being (it  may  well  eventually  take  on the  ontological  and singular 
status  that dogs  power; if and  when it does  it too  should be  aban-
done-d)  and  it  can  be  useful  for  certain  tasks  within certain  com-
munities  of analysis,  like  analyzing  contests  over certain  laws  in 
Australia. 
The concept of politics can be  used to  analyse  the  arrangements 
43 and  outcomes  of contests  over  different  objectives  in  panicular 
places involving particular forces (a formulation which I will replace 
from now on by  the term "sites of politics") without unnecessary ag-
gregation. There will not be a single, grand site of Politics or even an 
hierarchy of sites of politics. We can have the politics of a particular 
law in its own right, the politics of the Accord in its own right,  the 
politics of a school in its own right, etc. 
Power analysis then, should not be seen as a single enterprise. We 
are better off to  use a term like "analyses of the politics of ... ", sig-
nalling that analyses of sites of politics  ~re temporally and spatially 
specific activities with specific objects.  It also  signals an important 
point not raised so far:  the term "politics" should not be used on its 
own. If  it is always used in conjunction with a particular site-as-ob-
ject, ie the politics of a particular site, there is  far less chance of it 
becoming infected with the joint problems of an ontological and  a 
singular status. 
From the Law to Laws 
n this section I want to  problematize the concept of the law (in 
the  singular)  in  a  way  very  similar  to  that  in  which  I 
problematized the concept of power in the previous section. The 
need  to  undertake  the  problematization  of the  law  is  suggested 
partly by the points presented in the Introduction and  partly  (more 
importantly) by  the current operation of some critical jurisprudence 
arguments  in Australia.  (see especially  Duncanson,  1986)  In  other 
words this section is offered by way of support for these ctitical ar-
guments in confronting "two traditions  [which]  have  functioned  in 
the Anglo-American world to  constitute law as  a discrete unity" for 
"the  last two  centuries":  one,  "associated with  Blackstone,  whose 
unifying  concept  was  reason";  the  other,  "much more  familiar  in 
Australia and  the United Kingdom, is  the one associated with John 
Austin,  which  confers  unity  by  reference  to  political  authority". 
(Duncanson, 1986: 9) So, more accurately, this section is offered by 
way of support for critical arguments mentioned above in confront-
ing the second of these two traditions. 
In this  section I  will  suggest a less  drastic reformulation of the 
concept of the law than that suggested for power in the previous sec-
tion.  I will  argue that the law should be  replaced by  the concept of 
discrete laws (the definite article disappears). My argumentative plan 
of attack will be similar to  that adopted in the previous section inas-
44 much  as  I  will  be  arguing  against  a  general  theoretical  concept 
which is often given its own ontological and singular status in much 
political analysis, in favour of a specific concept informed by tactical 
considerations. 
Such  tactical  considerations  necessitate  an  eclectic  approach  to 
rheoretical  sources.  Theoretical  writings  should be  scrutinized  for 
their tactical  usefulness.  Rigid commitments to  particular theorist:, 
should be avoided. The work of any theorist should be used selec-
tively. For example, Foucault's work is ambivalent when it comes to 
a  role  for the  concept of the law.  Sometimes Foucault encourages 
the abandonment of any unified concept of the law- as when he tells 
us  that the law is not a "mask for power", that power cannot be in-
terpreted  in  terms  of the  law,  that  the  law is "neither the  truth of 
power nor its alibi". (1980b: 140-1) But at other times he contradicts 
this by giving a unified concept of the law pride of place - as  when 
he  tells  us  that  disciplinary  power uses  the  law  to  give  it an  ap-
pearance  of  legitimacy,  to  "disguise"  its  "effective  exercise". 2 
(1980a: 105-6) 
In seeking to  tum away from consideration of the law towards 
consideration of different laws,  we might begin by thinking of dif-
ferent laws in the same way we think of different procedural techni-
ques,  like  techniques  for  filing  documents  in  an  office.  These 
procedural techniques can be formalized and written down (as par-
ticular laws are), can be policed (as particular laws are), perhaps by 
an  office  manager,  and  a  breach of the  techniques  by  any  one of 
those subject to  them can be punished (as is the case with breaches 
of  particular  laws),  perhaps  by  dismissal.  Just  as  we  are  likely, 
within  the  current  spatial  and  temporal  limits  referred  to  in  the 
previous section, to  consider the  specific effects of these particular 
procedural  techniques only in terms of their specific operations in 
specific  places  at  specific  times,  without  reference  to  a  general 
theory of the procedure, so  we might begin to  consider the specific 
effects of particular laws only in terms of their specific operations in 
speci fie  places  at  particular  times,  without  reference  to  a  general 
theory of the law.  It is  only when we allow different laws to become 
the law that we run into the sort of esentialist problems of analysis I 
have been discussing. 
It should be noted that I am not suggesting that a general theory of 
procedural techniques is  impossible. A general theory of procedural 
techniques is just as  possible as a general theory of the law. Indeed, 
45 one  or more  such  theories  may  be  forming,  or may  have  already 
furmed, in certain institunons where techniques of administration are 
currently  being uni fled  into  a  science of administration.  l  am only 
~uggesting that my  analogy is effective when  we compare the law 
and procedural techniques within the current spatial and temporal 
limits of political  analysis. The concern of this  paper,  it  must  be 
remembered, is political analysi~. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  within  the  mstitutions  of political 
analysis my arguments against the general concept of the law are not 
r)[}ly  posed against ingrained uses of this concept. Ce1tainly such in-
grained uses- the singular and onrologically certain uses of the con· 
:epr of the law which seem such an easy and ready part of analysts' 
1uols - are the main target of my criticisms. But the arguments also 
il~1ve validity against the more conscious., rhetorical uses of this con-
l·cpt.  It seems to me that such uses, whether they are by forces trying 
1u  achieve what are often called "left political  objective:.;''  in order 
to,  for example, unify disparate groups for tactical  purposes, or by 
forces  trying to achieve what are  often called '"reactionary  political 
l>bjectives'' in order to,  for example, enforce the rule of law for the 
benefit of the  people (I'm thinking here of the  current Queensland 
government's anti-union campaign), are as flawed as ingrained uses. 
Indeed,  these  rhetorical  uses  serve  to  deflect  attention  from  the 
j)roblems of the ingrained uses and may even serve, in doing su, to 
~_·ement the ingrained uses of the law more fim1ly  in  place. 
Shifting the forces of analyses of the  politics of legal  sites away 
t1om the law and towards specific laws involves, at a  fuirly  simple 
hut  nonetheless  imponant  level,  a  rejection  of the  obviousnes~ of 
laws.  Phillipps  quotes  Brecht  to  emphasize  this  point:  "hcfore 
Llrniliarity can turn into awareness the familiar must he  strippl'd of 
its  inconspicuousness, we must give up assuming that  the'  uhject ill 
question  needs no explanation". (as quotc:d  in  Phillipps,  1082:  55) 
\\'e  have  to  examine  the  specific  effect~ of panicular Jaws  in  p:tr-
ticular sites and we cannot assume that wh~1t we analyze in une  c~L>e 
at a certain time will be the same in another case or in  the  ~anw  ,·a~e 
at another time. 
Shifting the tocu:-. of analysi:, abo involves a rejection •A any L'ul1-
crde ontological status for laws (very  ~imilar to  the  rL'jcctlon  of an 
ontological  "ratus  for  powr:r in  the  previous ;,ectiun).  La\VS  shmilJ 
nut  be  seen  as  real  entities  with  etern:d  me:ming~ built  intl>  rlw;; 
realness.  Rather,  they  should  be  c;cen  a~  conditiOilS,  <ltll'->ll)J  ulhn 
46 conditions, of the operation of sites of the politics of Jaws (especially 
courtrooms,  sites  of policing,  sites  of counselling,  etc).  Laws  are 
·onditions which have effects on the operation of these sites via their 
.. wn operation, not simply by their real existence. That is, laws only 
::we effects inasmuch as they are used, either directly or indirectly. 
Laws of property for example, have no concrete effects in them-
selves. They  have  effects  only  in their different operations in dif-
ferent sites, ie  in their different uses. Police use them, we might say 
read them, in a certain way in a certain situation (and use them dif-
ferently  in different situations).  Judges  and lawyers use  them  in a 
certain way  in  a  ceitain situation (and use  them differently in dif-
ferent  situations).  Property  developers,  local  government officials, 
politicans,  etc  also  use  them  in certain  ways  in  ceitain  situations 
(and use them differently in different situations). 
Laws  1Jwn.  are  effectively  different laws  in  different  situations, 
lhere is  nothing unifying them into entities with universai and eter-
nal  meanings  and  effects.  To  say  this  is  nol  to  douht  that  some 
usages of laws can be quite widespread. The possibility of their wide 
usage is  given by the operations of certain mechanisms (the effects 
of which cannot themselves be guaranteed of course) which osten-
sibly  have  a  currency in  a  wide  range of legal  sites.  Examples of 
such mechanisms include fOJmal  legal and para-legal training in cer-
tain  procedures, ceitain legal texts and other publications and, more 
informally, certain extra-procedural codes, like loyalty. However, no 
matter how widespread certain usages of panicular laws become, we 
should not mistake such widespread usages for means of unification 
of I  aws  to  the  point where uni versa!  and eternal  meanings  and ef-
fects can be attributed to them. 
The operation of different laws in different sites involves differem 
actors  or  subjects.  Before  we  discuss  actors  in  legal  sites  I  will 
\ummarize some arguments posed elsewhere (Wickham,  1987:  150-
2)  about actors in other sites of politics. Actors should be thought of, 
following  Althusser, as  always-already  operating in  particular sites 
of politics,  rather  thau  as  being  produced  or  constituted  in  these 
srtes, or in  some grand arena like Power or the  Class Struggle. The 
notion of the  production or constitution of actors should be avoided 
:rc,  it  lc:Jds  to  analysts  trying  to  know  actors  by  attempting  direct 
~rwwledge of their originating  moment.  Analysis  of actors  within 
',Jtc~ \hould concentrate only on their (always-already) operation. In 
tillS  1vay,  ,;mph:Jsis  will  be  put on  the  different ways in  which dif-
47 ferent forms of actor are operating in different sites. No attempt will 
be  made  to  unify  actors  into  one  form,  whether  it  be  human  in-
dividual or social class. 
It  will  be  noticed  that  I  am  using  the  term  "actor"  whereas  I 
promoted the use of the term "subject-form" in the paper from which 
the above points are summarized. I am doing so mainly because the 
term "subject-form" might prove confusing in the context of discuss-
ing legal sites. The term "legal subject" has a technical legal mean-
ing in many legal sites, as a bearer of certain rights. In choosing "ac-
tor"  I am  following  Barry  Hindess  (1986)  and  the  contribution by 
Graeme Lowe to  this volume. 
In  line  with the  arguments  summarized above,  we  should  reject 
any  general  category of legal  actors - such as  a ruling class which 
controls laws,  or individuals who  are  protected and/or co-erced by 
laws  - in  favour·  of  considerations  of  the  specific  form(s)  and 
operation(s) of actors in those sites of politics where a law (or laws) 
are  operating.  So,  for  example,  instead  of  seeing  Australian 
employees as  individuals (with common psychological and biologi-
cal  characteristics),  we  have  to  consider employees  as  a  specific 
form  of actors.  Moreover  we  have  to  consider  the  way  different 
types of employee operate as  different forms of actor, with different 
statuses and capacities, in different sites in Australia where different 
laws (laws governing the public service, laws governing the building 
industry, laws governing workers' compensation, etc) are operating. 
Instead of analyzing  the  operation of employees in terms  of their 
repression as  individuals, or as  a class, by  a ruling class which uses 
laws as  instruments, or in terms of their struggle against this repres-
sion,  we  have  to  consider  the  specific  politinl  effects  of  the 
operations of specific forms of employee in terms uf specific objec-
tives  in  particular sites.  At  a certain  time  we  might,  for  instance, 
have  to  decide  whether  the  operation  of  the  form  of  actor 
"Australian public  servant" serves  to  promote secrecy and  lack of 
accountability  in  Australian  government  or  whether  it  serves  to 
protect necessary  administrative jobs. Of course our answer might 
be  both  or either  and  our answer  will  be  different  depending  on 
when it is  given and what site is  involved - whether it is  an official 
inquiry into the operation of government or a hearing before the Ar-
bitration Commission, to name just two possibilities. 
I argued  earlier that some  usages  of laws  are  fairly  widespread, 
though never universal or eternal, because of the operation of certain 
48 mechanisms  like  formal  legal  trammg.  I  now  want  to  urgue  that 
some forms of legal actor also have a wide currency, a currency in  ~~ 
range of sites where laws are operating. Examples of widely operat-
ing forms of legal actor include judges, courts, lawyers,  coun~ellors, 
police and criminals. Of course we should never allow these often-· 
repeated forms to become essences (as meta-actors or meta-:--ubjects. 
like  the  individual),  to  treat them  as  if they  necessarily  occur and 
operate in the same way wherever laws  are operating.  But  we can 
and should consider the ways in which the wide repetition ot these 
specialist forms can have wide effects in terms of certain spe·,:i lie ob-
jectives.  For  example,  Phillipps  considers  the  repetition  ot'  the 
specialist legal  form of actor "delinquent" - a  type  of the  c.pecilic 
form  "criminal"  - in  a  range of sites  where certain c ri mi nal  I  aw~ 
operate, particularly courtrooms. He argues that this wide repetition 
has  a  major  bearing  on  the  continuance  of  certain  medicaL 
psychiatric  and  criminological  practices  to  treat  the  ""delinque11t"' 
which in tum furthers  the  objective of incarceration as  a  means of 
punishment}  rehabilitation. (1982: 60-1) 
Once  the  basic  unit  of political  analysis  of  sites  where  l:m::, 
operate is  shifted from the law to  specific laws, it might be  sugges-
ted  that  a  further  shift  is  required  to  take  into  account  rhe  way 
specific laws work in different sites. In the example to be oflered in 
the following section I will briefly discuss the internal regulations of 
a particular organization. Elsewhere I have argued that  the concept 
of specific laws should be supplemented by the concept of specilic 
regulations.  (Wickham,  1985)  I  no  longer  thi-nk  this  ne,:e~sary 
Within institutions of political analysis a move from  the law to Liws 
seems to  me now to  be all  that is  required to  break the  essentialist 
grip of the concept of the law. This tactical judgement suggests th;1t 
to  go  beyond  this  to  a  further  breakdown  into  the  concept  ut 
regulations, as a base unit of analysis, would be to undereqimate the 
potential  of the  concept of specific  laws  (I'm  now  sure  analysts 
specializing in legal fields have known of this  potential  for  ~~  \ong 
time; they would see my erstwhile underestimation, quite correctly 
as  ignorance of the complexity of legal fields).  It would also  be  to 
risk confusion by using a concept -regulations- which alrt>ady  plays 
a variety of roles in legal literature. Regulations should be examined 
where  they  are  operating,  but  they  need  not be fonnuLtrecl  into  a 
special supplementary concept to help the concept of laws overcome 
the problems associated with the law. Of course, as  I noted hefore  i11 
the  case of politics vis  a  vis  power, there is  no  guarantee  th~tt  the 
concept of laws will not eventually serve the same essentialist func 
49 tion I  am attributing to  the law.  My judgement about laws as  ade-
quate for present purposes is  made within the  temporal and spatial 
limits of contemporary Australian political analysis. 
Using the Concept of Laws in Political Analysis: An Example 
Australia's broadcasting laws  govern broadcasting practices across 
the country. These laws operate, they only have effects, in different 
instances. The operations of these  laws involve a  range of specific 
actors -viewer, listener, licencee, community, Australian Broadcast-
ing Tribunal, etc. On the question of broadcasting "blasphemous, in-
decent  or  obscene  matter",  the  Australian  Broadcasting  Tribunal 
Manual ( 1984) cites the  Broadcasting and Television Act 1942 (as 
amended) as  follows:  "There is  absolutely no ban on the  transmis-
sion of particular language". It goes on to outline the factors that are 
"likely to  be relevant in a consideration of whether language would 
substantially  offend  contemporary community  standards of decen-
cy".  These  factors  include:  "The  nature  of the  transmission  as  a 
whole.  Was  the  use of the  language in context? Was it gratuitous? 
Was it deliberate? What was the overall purpose of the transmission? 
Did it involve a serious matter or artistic or literary merit? Did it in-
volve a serious discussion of some moral or social issue?" (  47 -8) 
It is not my intention here to discuss all the effects of the various 
usages of this part of this particular law; these various usages, espe-
cially  those  by  the  Australian  Broadcasting Tribunal,  have  had  a 
large range of specific effects, particularly for public radio stations -
including the  temporary  suspension of 4ZZZ,  the  tightening  up of 
control of programming at 3RRR and, conversely, the freeing up of 
control of programming at  3CR.  (Interviews with Reece Lamshed, 
station manager 3RRR, and Geoff Swanton, station manager 3CR, 1 
July  1985) What I want to do here is highlight the way the internal 
regulations of one particular public radio  station (not one of those 
mentioned above) worked to produce a very harsh usage of this part 
of this law in one particular case. 
The  particular  case  involved  a  series  of  programmes  on  the 
politics of rock music - "The Politics of Rock and Roll" - made for 
6 UVS in Perth. The programmes, not surprisingly, discussed the ad-
vent and  role  of punk rock and featured several examples of punk 
rock.  In one programme several such examples contained the word 
luck. When this  programme went to  air,  the manager of 6UVS, via 
an intermediary, immediately stopped it and banned the remainder of 
50 the  programmes in the  series. The manager used station regulations 
to justify this action. He read these regulations to include the follow-
ing points about the relevant part of the relevant law: that "the word 
fuck [is] one of two words that are all but impossible to justify under 
any circumstances"; that the use of any such word must be limited 
("3  times  in  less  than  30  minutes  is  excessive  by  anyone's  stan-
dards!") that the playing of pieces of music does not by itself con-
stitute  "a serious  matter of artistic or literary  merit"  or "a serious 
discussion of some moral or social issue" ("virtually nothing in the 
commentary added to or supported the artistic elevation of the music 
tracks beyond the level of basic existence"; "There was no depth to 
the discussion at all"); that the word "fuck" should not be broadcast 
to  "those  below  school  age  and  unemployed  youth".  (Correspon-
dence  between  Bill  McGinness,  station  manager  6UVS,  and  the 
producers of "The Politics of Rock and Roll",  18  June 1985 and 24 
June 1985) 
In this case the use of the concept of specific laws greatly benefits 
a  political  analysis  of  censorship  on  Perth  radio.  Certainly  an 
analysis would have been possible using the concept of the law, but 
it would have stalled at a very grand level. Using the concept of laws 
in  the  way  I  have here,  based  on the  arguments  contained  in  the 
previous two sections, means analysis can be undertaken of the way 
broadcasting laws operate in many  specific  sites,  not just obvious 
sites like  the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal.  In this way,  I have 
examined  a  usage of Australian  Broadcasting  laws,  involving  the 
operation  of  the  specific  form  of  actor  "responsible  station 
manager", that has served to  promote the specific political objective 
of censoring the content of the radio airwaves in Perth. 
I  am indebted to Graeme Lowe for many fruitful discussions about 
various issues relating to the politics of legal fields.  I would like to 
thank Valerie Kerruish and Richard Mitchell for their helpful com-
ments and suggestions on  an  earlier draft of this paper and John 
Hartley for helping me formulate  the  example about broadcasting 
laws. 
51 NOTES 
1I  owe  an  acknowledgement  to  the  cultural  theorist  Stephen 
Greenblatt here. He writes: 
In  order  to  achieve  the  negotiatiOn,  artists  need  to 
create  a  currency  that  is  valid  for  a  meaningful, 
mutually  profitable  exchange  ...  I  should  add that  the 
society's dominant currencies, money and prestige, are 
invariably involved, but I  am here using the term cur-
rency  metaphorically  to  designate  the  systematic  ad-
justments, symbolisations and lines of credit necessary 
to enable an exchange to take place. (1987: 13) 
2Colin Gordon (1977) goes into more detail  about Foucault's treat-
ment of law, especially criminal law. 
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